What are you up to, Kenny Williams?

The Hot Stove seasons has barely gotten off the ground for the vast majority of teams, but White Sox GM, Kenny Williams, has quietly renovated his franchise this November, with a trade and three veteran free agent signings. Based on the content of these acquisitions, however, White Sox fans have to be wondering: what is he up to?

This past week, in the span of 48 hours, Williams signed two players who have combined for 21 Gold Gloves, easily the most of any active duo. However, both Andruw Jones and Omar Vizquel are in the twilight of their careers, as demonstrated by the fact that both spent to majority of 2009 on the Rangers bench. They weren't exactly massively productive in their limited capacity, either. Vizquel managed just a 660 OPS in his 195 plate appearances. Jones had a strong showing during the season's first four months (891 OPS, 17 HR), but he really struggled down the stretch (488 OPS, 0 HR in August and September).

The fact which should not be ignored it that the Rangers had a resurgent season in 2009. Vizquel and Jones were a major part of an improved culture in Texas as apparently popular clubhouse presences. Like Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, and Ken Griffey Jr., they proved that future Hall of Famers (or borderline Hall of Famers, depending on your perspective) bring more to a franchise than just what they do on the field. Omar not only contributed over 400 innings of errorless defense at shortstop, second, and third base, but served as mentor for Elvis Andrus and, to a lesser extent, Michael Young and Ian Kinsler, helping to solidify a previously porous infield. The White Sox, in Alexei Ramirez and Gordon Beckham, have a pair of middle infielders who, like Andrus and Kinsler, have incredible defensive tools, but are still a little rough around the edges. Vizquel will be asked to pass along his considerable wisdom.

Similarly, although Jones acted primarily as a DH in '09, and will probably spend much of his time in that role again in '10, he is one of the greatest defensive outfielders of all time. The White Sox outfield defense has been atrocious the past couple years. Any influence he exerts on Carlos Quentin, Alex Rios, and whomever the White Sox bring in complete their outfield, could only bring improvement.

It would have appeared, based on the decision to part ways with Jermaine Dye, Jim Thome, Dewayne Wise, and Jose Contreras, that Williams was committed to making the White Sox younger in 2010. The acquisition of Vizquel (43) and Jones (33), along with the retention of Mark Kotsay (34) and the trading of Chris Getz (26) and Josh Fields (27), pushes defiantly in the other direction. So, what is the upside?

First of all, cost. Even if Jones reaches all the incentives in his contract, he, Kotsay, and Vizquel will not cost Chicago any more than $4.5 Million in 2010. According to FanGraphs, the trio posted about $6.6 Million worth of production in 2009, so this is likely a pretty safe investment. Even safer when you consider that none is signed past next season.

The White Sox have every incentive to go for it in 2010. They have an aging core and 2011 will bring with it a series of free agent decisions which will likely lead to a complete and total overhaul of the club. After next season Paul Konerko, A. J. Pierzynski, Freddy Garcia, and Mark Teahen will become free agents. The following year they will be joined on the open market by Mark Buehrle, Bobby Jenks, and Alexei Ramirez. While in 2009, Chicago still retained eight players who had won rings with them in 2005, by 2012, the White Sox may bear zero resemblance to that hyper-popular team.

By solidifying his bench early in the offseason, Williams allows himself to concentrate exclusively on the White Sox major needs for the remainder of the winter, namely outfield and designated hitter. He knows exactly what kind of flexibility he has on the remainder of the roster and the payroll and won't have to do any desperate maneuvering late in the spring.

By the time the arbitration period ends, the White Sox will probably have about $85 Million committed to 21 or 22 players on their major-league roster. Over the last four seasons they have maintained a payroll of $100-110 Million. They have plenty of options moving up through the system to provide depth on the pitching staff, so if the White Sox ownership, led by Jerry Reinsdorf, is willing to back him, Williams may be able to commit as much as $25 Million to improving the lineup. If that's the case, then the White Sox could still make a serious run at the cream of the free agent crop (Jason Bay makes some sense for them, as would Chone Figgins) or could continue to covet other team's albatrosses, as they did with Jake Peavy and Alex Rios. Williams has plenty of flexibility, because Konerko, Teahen, or Quentin could easily be moved to DH if the White Sox added a better defensive option at first, third, or in left. Williams also has the luxury of considering whether to go after one BIG fish (Bay, Adrian Gonzalez, Matt Holliday, etc.) or two smaller ones, as Jones and Kotsay could act as a decent DH/1B/OF platoon if they were hitting low in the lineup.

Although Willaims approach thusfar certainly betrays a considerably amount of risk, it also suggests that he has a concerted plan and aims to put a very competitive team on the field in the AL Central. Minnesota is struggling to re-sign Joe Mauer and patchwork its decimated rotation. The Tigers are considering blowing up the expensive, underperforming squad which has broken Detroit's heart in each of the past two seasons. The Indians are probably at least a year away from seeing the fruits of the rebuilding campaign which shipped away C. C. Sabathia, Cliff Lee, and Victor Martinez. And, Kansas City, well...the Royals are acting like the most mismanaged franchise in baseball, as usual. Which means the White Sox look to me like the team with the best laid plans for taking their division in 2010.

Open Letter To The Rangers

Dear Nolan & Ron -

Congrats. I love what you've done with the place. You're threatening to post a team ERA under 4.60 for the first time since 2004, which was, coincidently, the last time the Rangers had a winning record. You've still got no shortage of power, but also improved speed and infield defense with the promotion of Elvis Andrus and the conversion of Micheal Young. As of today, you've got the best damn record in the American League. I'm proud of you guys. We all are.

That said, there's a few issues I'd like to address. Don't get me wrong, I admire your skills and trust your judgment. Kudos on the Josh Hamilton trade and the Mark Texeira deal (which netted Andrus [.289, 21 R, leading MLB shortstops in Range Factor, leading AL shortstops in Ultimate Zone Rating], Matt Harrison [3-2, 3.82 ERA, 5.00 K/BB in May], Jarrod Saltalamacchia [respectable platoon catcher], and Neftali Feliz [2-2, 3.93 ERA, 36 K, 34 IP in AAA at age 21]). Letting Milton Bradley walk, it was a tough decision, but the right decision. Ian Kinsler (17th Round, 2003) was a stellar draft pick and getting Nelson Cruz thrown into the Carlos Lee rental was pure genius. Omar Vizquel and Andruw Jones have been outstanding inexpensive veteran free agent acquisition.

There's a lot to hang your hats on, but it's only June and there's a lot of baseball left. The Angels managed to stay above .500 even without Lackey, Guerrero, and Santana. They're only five games back. It's time to plug the holes.

First, you're getting a 687 OPS from your first basemen, primarily Chris Davis. That's 200 points below the AL average and 27th in baseball. He's got a lot of pop and a lot of potential, clearly another great draft pick (5th round, 2006), but he needs to re-build his confidence and you can't afford to carry that kind of OPS at a premier position. You've got other options.

Secondly, you need to find a way to keep Josh Hamilton in the lineup. I know, I know, you're off to this great start even though he's missed 15 games and been mediocre when he's been available, but in the long run, he carries the big stick that opposing pitchers fear. Down the stretch, you're going to want visions of Home Run Derby in Yankee Stadium dancing in their heads. Josh is a monstrous talent, but obviously he's a little injury prone. That's what happens when you abuse your body the way he has. Help him out. Don't allow him opportunities to pull his groin diving into the wall in center field. Put him in right. Or at DH. Sure, Blalock is injury-prone too, but he plays a less active position (1B) and is infinitely more replaceable (with Chris Davis, Max Ramirez, and Justin Smoak waiting in the wings).

Tangentially, when did Andruw Jones become a DH? As I recall this is a man who for a long time was spoken of as potentially the greatest center-fielder of all time. I know he's more portly than he used to be, but as recently as 2007 he trailed only Coco Crisp in Ultimate Zone Rating at 22.4. Last season Hamilton was at -17.7. I have a hard time believing that Andruw's decline has been that steep. With a ballpark like Arlington, where every flyball gives your pitcher a coronary, it seems like the graceful glide of Andruw Jones would be a welcome sight, especially if it also helps to protect one of the best hitters in the AL.

Finally, teams do not win pennants with Kevin Millwood as their Ace. Just ask the Braves. As a #2, sure, but not as an Ace. You've got the prospects. You're going to need to be aggressive...but wise!!! Jake Peavy is a flyball pitcher, not right for you. The same goes for Dan Haren. Guys who do make sense for you, who may (or may not) be available include Roy Halladay (53.7 GB% in '08), Aaron Cook (55.9%), Roy Oswalt (50.3%), and Cliff Lee (45.9%). Go get one of them. It'll take the pressure of Millwood and the kids (McCarthy, Harrison, Holland, and Feliz).

Anyway, keep up the good work.

Best of luck,

Hippeaux

The New Moneyball Icon

A few years back, in 2003, Micheal Lewis published a book called Moneyball which became synonymous with a new approach to baseball strategy at the general managing level. The subject of Moneyball was, specifically, Oakland GM Billy Beane, generally considered the mastermind behind this new approach, though he would likely give due credit to the many sabermetricians, like Bill James and Rob Neyer, and modern baseball geniuses, like John Schuerholz and Tony LaRussa, who have in some way or another participated in revising the way a baseball roster is viewed during the past decade.

It is accurate to say, as many have, that Moneyball preaches an increased allegiance to statistical analysis as a way of evaluating individual players and the teams that they play for. Standing alone, naturally, this is a gross oversimplification of Beane's philosophy, but it is undeniable that Moneyball helped popularize statistics like OBP, OPS, and WHIP, and that it was due, at least in part, to said statistics that Beane pursued players like Scott Hatteburg, Erubiel Durazo, Nick Swisher, Chad Bradford, and Mark Ellis. None of these players are superstars (though perhaps Swisher is on the cusp), but they have all been inexpensive contributors in the Athletics franchise, which has gone 901-718 (.557) since Beane took over the reigns in 1998. He has led them to five playoff appearance, and posted the franchise only back-to-back 100-win seasons since 1931. 2007 was the first year a Beane team finished under .500 since his first year as GM. All this despite the fact that Oakland has never had a payroll higher than $80 Million or 16th best in the major leagues. When they won 100 games in '01 and '02, their payrolls were 29th and 28th, respectively.

Several of Beane's proteges have moved on to GM jobs of their own. Most notably, current Blue Jays GM J. P. Riccardi, who figures prominently in Moneyball. Many successful GMs, from both big and small markets, have adapted Moneyball tactics to fit there needs, including Theo Epstein in Boston, Kevin Towers in San Diego, and Walt Jocketty in St. Louis. They are both Beane disciples and innovators in their own right.

The simplest way to describe the Moneyball strategy when it comes to acquiring players via trades and free agency, is to say that it targets players who are "slightly damaged." That is, there is something about them that is going to raise the eyebrows of potential suitors, whether it is age, a weight problem, a weak throwing arm, a reckless temper, a history of injuries, an awkward delivery, a tendency to strike out, a defensive liability, a bad platoon split, or just plain slowness. Ideally, such a player also has a strength which is likely to go overlooked: discipline at the plate, reliability, endurance, bat control, or a good platoon split.

Here are a few examples:

Prior to the 2003 season, Beane masterminded a four-team trade, acquiring Erubiel Durazo from the Arizona Diamondbacks. The Athletics gave up the only player in the deal who never reached the majors, a relief pitcher named Jason Arnold. Durazo was slow, fat, and apparently unable to hit left-handed pitching, which is why he'd never been a full-time starter in Arizona. During his next two seasons in Oakland, playing everyday as the designated hitter, he hit 43 HR, scored 172 runs, and drove in 165 more. He even received a few votes for MVP in 2004. In 2003 he actually hit lefties better than righties. Over the course of those two seasons the Athletics paid Durazo a total of just over $3 Million. As a comparison, the Yankees paid Jason Giambi, a former Athletic, approximately $24 Million in '03-'04. He hit 53 HR, scored 130 runs, and drove in 147 RBI.

Between 2004 and 2005, Beane dealt two of his "Big Three" starting pitcher, Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder. For Mulder, he received Dan Haren, Daric Barton, and Kiko Calero from St. Louis. The Cardinals saw Haren as, at best, a back-end of the rotation starter, they were concerned about his lack of intensity on the mound and his tendency to give up the long ball. During the 2004 season they had even converted him into a reliever. Beane immediately inserted the 24-year-old into his rotation. Haren pitched upward of 200 innings in each of the next three seasons, going 43-34. Calero has been a valuable middle reliever, and Barton is likely to start next season as Oakland's first baseman. Meanwhile, Mulder has gone 22-18 in three injury-plagued seasons in St. Louis, while earning around $18 Million. Oakland has paid the trio of Haren, Barton, and Calero somewhere in the neighborhood of $6 Million.

In 2006, the Athletics signed Frank Thomas, the future hall-of-famer who'd watched from the disabled list as the White Sox, the team he'd spent 15 seasons with, won the World Series in 2005 and decided they no longer needed him. He was 38, coming off back-to-back injury plagued seasons. Beane signed him to be the A's DH for a measly $500,000, one sixteenth of what Thomas made from Chicago the year previous. He finished 2006 with 39 HR, 114 RBI, and a 925 OPS. He was fourth in the running for the MVP and led the Athletics to the playoffs, while the White Sox fell short on a return trip. Thomas' replacement, Jim Thome, was roughly his statistical equal, but he cost Chicago 28 times more money.

One might argue that Beane deftness in deals like these (as well as many others) inspired other GMs to take chances on guys like Carlos Pena (can't hit lefties), Dmitri Young (old, fat, tempermental), Josh Hamilton (addicted to meth), and Cris Carpenter (injury-prone).

This offseason we are seeing the backlash. There is no shortage of "slightly damaged" players
Mike Cameron is facing a suspension, coming of an injury and took a small step backward offensively and defensively in 2007. Andruw Jones just had the worst offensive season since his rookie year, appears a little pudgy, and isn't even considered an option by the team he's spent his entire career with. Bartolo Colon hasn't pitched more than 100 innings since he won the Cy Young in '05, he'll turn 35 in May, and weighs well over 250 lbs., regardless of what the media guide says. Barry Bonds, Milton Bradley, Jose Guillen, Eric Gagne, Carlos Silva, Jason Jennings: all come with serious risks. And yet, at least in these opening weeks of the Hot Stove season, few of these players seem resigned to taking a contract that, either in value or duration, compensates for such shortcomings. The somewhat understandable position of baseball agents has become, in the wake of Moneyball, that merely being an established major league player in your late twenties or early thirties means you're entitled to a big payday, regardless of any extenuating circumstances. This may appear to some as indicative of greed and stubbornness on the part of the players and their representation (and there may be some truth to that), but it is also true that the game generally and each individual team is more profitable than it has ever been. The benefits of supportive fans and diversified revenue streams should not be passed on only to the owners and players the caliber of A-Rod, Carlos Zambrano, and Ichiro, but to all the players, particularly those who have paid their dues, as Cameron, Jones, Colon, et al definitely have.

A few years ago, coming off a brutal injury and three straight season of declining productivity, Jermaine Dye, a power-hitting outfielder in his prime, took a two-year deal (with an optional third year) for under $10 Million. Dye turned in two solid, relatively healthy seasons for the White Sox (including an MVP-caliber campaign in '06) and was rewarded with an extension worth more than double the money. This would seem an appropriate template for Andruw Jones. The dollar values would be considerably higher, but the idea would be the same. Take a short term deal, re-establish himself, and then get an even bigger contract when he's 33 or 34. His agent, the ubiquitous Scott Boras, continues to quote Jones' expectations as somewhere between Torii Hunter (5 yr./$90 Mil.) and Vernon Wells (7 yr./$126 Mil.). I think it is almost certain that they will at least get a four or five year deal worth upwards of $15 Million per season. Cameron will likely end up in the range of Gary Matthews Jr. (5 yr./$50 Mil.) and Juan Pierre (5 yr./$44 Mil.), though maybe for less years.

As the market adapts, GMs will have to reconsider their Moneyball tactics. With less players taking short-term deals, there is a much higher price on reliability, even if it is merely reliable mediocrity (witness Jeff Suppan (4 yr./$42 Mil.), Jason Marquis (3 yr./$21 Mil.), and A. J. Pierzynski (3 yr./$18 Mil.)). Likewise, as we have already seen this offseason, we will probably be seeing more trades that have long-term repercussions for both clubs. There will be fewer deadline blockbusters and one-year rent-a-players. If you're giving up three or four top prospects for a Johan Santana, Miguel Cabrera, or Mark Texeira, you intend to sign them to a five or six year extension.

Although there is no guaranteeing that Beane will be at the forefront of the next trend, watch carefully what he does this offseason. He may be on the verge of blowing up his team, a la the Florida Marlins, beginning a full-scale, multiple season rebuilding process of the type that has been generally unpopular during the Moneyball era. If he trades away Joe Blanton and Dan Haren, as rumored, it will definitely be unconventional. Pitching is regarded as a rare commodity, so frontline starters almost never get traded in the middle of their contracts. Both Haren and Blanton have three years left before free agency at prices well below their market value. Beane can reasonable ask for packages equivalent to those being offered for Santana, Jon Garland, etc., because Haren and Blanton will be significantly cheaper investments. If Haren and Blanton get traded, I expect there could be a wholesale auction, with Rich Harden, Huston Street, Bobby Crosby, Dan Johnson, Mark Kotsay, and Nick Swisher all on the block. Beane will be looking for prospects around which to build his new suburban stadium.

So, who is the next Moneyball icon? The player who presents a moderate risk, with a sizable potential for reward? Later this week I'll outline a few free agents (or soon-to-be free agents) that fit the profile.