Notes on the Noughties

During the last few weeks the baseball media has been dominated by discussions of All-Decade rankings for players and teams. These discussions are, of course, founded upon an arbitrary window, which means they can lead to some odd conclusions. For instance, it has been generally accepted that Player of the Decade consideration comes down to A-Rod and Pujols, both of whom are certainly legitimate choices. However, imagine if we were including Barry Bonds' final two campaigns in the late '90s, or even had he been allowed to continue playing for two more seasons in his mid-forties (seasons which Bud Selig robbed from fans, a sin for which the commissioner should never be forgiven).

Bonds would, of course, lead Pujols and A-Rod in the vast majority of ratios and advanced metrics (OBP, SLG, OPS, WAR, Win Shares, etc.) and would be near the top in several counting categories as well (HR, BB, R, etc.). At the very least, it would have to be considered a three-horse race. A similar assumption can be made about Greg Maddux, who, despite retiring prior to the 2009 season, is still among the top ten starting pitchers of the decade in wins, starts, and innings, among other things.

However, despite the fact that All-Decade debates are purely academic, they operate as a mode for appreciating the recent history of the sport we love and, as such, are an enjoyable aspect of this Hot Stove season. As my contribution, I would like to levy praise upon a few people who have been under-represented in the All-Decade articles I've read so far. Most of these guys aren't worthy of being considered in the greatest players of the decade discussions at any position. In some cases, far from it. But their contributions nonetheless made an impact on the game and its fans, and in many cases, helped to define the way baseball was evolving in the decade of the 2000s.

Innings-Eater of the Decade: Livan Hernandez

The defining rotations of the 1990s were composed of three- and four-headed monsters: Maddux, Glavine, and Smoltz in Atlanta; Nagy, Hershiser, & Martinez in Cleveland; and the revolving door of free agent Aces who joined with Andy Pettitte in the Bronx (Clemens, Cone, Wells, Gooden, Rogers, & El Duque). I'm not sure that the "innings-eating" #3 starter was purely an invention of the Noughties, but teams certainly valued such pitchers more than ever before. Jeff Suppan and Carlos Silva netted nearly $50 Million apiece on the promise of fulfilling that role. Jamie Moyer appears prepared to pitch into his fifties in that capacity. But for me, the quintessential innings-eater is Livan Hernandez.

Too often this decade, organizations like the Giants and Expos asked him to be their Ace and that was not his calling, but Livan Hernandez gobbles up innings at a rate unprecedented in the contemporary era. From 2000 until 2006, he never pitched less than 216 innings in a season, topping out at 255 in 2004. Three times he led the league in innings, twice in complete games, and four times in hits allowed. This decade he threw a total of 2201 innings, 38 more than his closest competitor (Javier Vazquez). In the process he went 129-124 and maintained essentially a league-average ERA (4.46). Only Roy Halladay accumulated more complete games.

Best Season: Expos 2003 (15-10, 3.20 ERA, 1.21 WHIP, 178 K, 233 IP, 8 CG, 3.12 K/BB)

LOOGY of the Decade: Steve Kline & Ray King

The "left-handed one-out guy" got a fair amount of play in Michael Lewis's Moneyball and can safely be counted among the major innovations of the contemporary era, the credit going usually to Tony LaRussa and Dave Duncan. And whether they discovered the LOOGY or not, they certainly possessed the most effective implementation of it, when, in 2004, on their way to 105 wins and the NL Championship with the Cardinals, they employed two LOOGYs, Steve Kline and Ray King, who combined for 153 appearances and 112 innings. King and Kline completely shut down opposing left-handed sluggers, allowing one lonely homer during the entire season and an opponent's OPS under 450.

Both King and Kline had relatively prolonged careers in this capacity. From 2001 to 2007 King made at least 67 appearances every year and maintained a 3.52 ERA. From 2000 to 2007 Kline made at least 66 appearances every year and maintained a 3.32 ERA. They rank #9 and #11 in relief appearances over the course of the decade, combining for 1173 appearances and 889 innings. But 2004 was the best for each.

Best Season: 2004 Cardinals (Kline: 1.79 ERA, King: 2.61 ERA)

TTO of the Decade: Adam Dunn

The "Three True Outcomes" hitter was another topic of discussion in Moneyball, referring to players who ended the vast majority of their at-bats with either a strikeout, a walk, or a home run. In the "Juiced Ball" era, such players were valuable, despite the high number of "unproductive outs" they were prone to make.

49.1% of all of Adam Dunn's plate appearances ended in one of those outcomes. Compare that to a more traditional RBI man like Mark Texeira, whose TTO rate is 33.9% or a more extreme opposing example like Albert Pujols, whose TTO is just 28.7%, despite the fact that he has similar homer and walk rates.

Dunn led the league in strikeouts on three occasions in the Noughties. He led in walks once. Most importantly, he had a truly impressive run of five straight 40 HR seasons, which ended last year, when he hit "merely" 38.

Best Season: 2004 Reds (46 HR, 108 BB, 195 K, 102 RBI, 105 R, 956 OPS, 51.2% TTO)

WAR-rior of the Decade: Franklin Gutierrez

The Wins Above Replacement statistic has become a favored metric of sabermetricians in recent years. It, like Bill James' Win Shares, attempts to balance offensive production with defensive efficiency and positional scarcity. The names at the top of the list usually aren't too surprising - Pujols, Mauer, Utley, etc. - but the performance of Franklin Gutierrez has continued to defy projections.

Over the last three seasons, the performance of the Mariners 26-year-old centerfielder went from 1.8 wins above replacement t0 5.9, ranking him twelfth among all hitters in 2009. Base on FanGraphs tabulations, that means Gutierrez is worth somewhere in the vicinity of $20 Million a year, even though in 2009, he made the league minimum.

Obviously, Gutierrez's performance is based largely on his off-the-charts defensive ratings. His only comparable is Andruw Jones in his prime. This coming arbitration season will be interesting on many accounts (Tim Lincecum, anybody?), not the least of which is whether Gutierrez's agent can make a case for a large award based on the new evolutions in defensive analytics.

Best Season: 2009 Mariners (.283 AVG, 18 HR, 85 RBI, 764 OPS, 27.1 UZR, 5.9 WAR)

Most Underrated Pitcher: Mark Buehrle

I was listening to a Baseball Today podcast earlier this week as they discussed their All-Decade selections and Eric Karabell and Peter Pascarelli scoffed when a listener suggested that Mark Buehrle might be part of the All-Decade rotation. I will admit, he's probably borderline, but if you don't think he's in the running, you haven't been paying attention. Only Livan Hernandez and Javier Vazquez threw more innings during the 2000s, despite the fact that Buehrle was just 20 when the decade began. Among pitcher who pitched in every season of the 2000s, he ranks eighth in ERA at 3.80. He's won 135 games during that span, also good for eighth. And has been the picture of consistency.

From 2001 to 2009 Mark Buehrle never made less than 30 starts. He has five seasons of 15+ wins and has netted double-digit wins in every year. He ERA has risen above the league average only once, in his rough 2006 campaign (12-13, 4.99), and on many occasions he has been among the league leaders (as low as 3.12 in 2005). He has a World Series ring, a Gold Glove, four All-Star nods, and, of course, a no-hitter and a perfect game.

Best Season: 2005 White Sox (16-8, 3.12 ERA, 1.18 WHIP, 149 K, 237 IP, 3.73 K/BB)

Most Underrated Hitter: Bobby Abreu

His performance in this year's ALDS went a long way towards raising people's awareness, but Abreu's extraordinary performance this decade was often overshadowed by his teammates in Philadelphia and the Bronx. Abreu got to the plate more times than anybody in baseball during the 2000s and he finished in the top ten in hits (#8), runs (#5), RBI (#10), stolen bases (#6), walks (#2), and OBP (#8). He was a 30/30 man twice and a 20/20 man in every season except '06 (15/30), '07 (16/25), and '09 (15/30).

Best Season: 2004 Phillies (.301 AVG, 118 R, 30 HR, 105 RBI, 40 SB, 971 OPS)

Most Underrated Fielder: Pedro Feliz

I'm certainly open to debating whether a man who has never posted an OPS of 800+ is worthy of being a major-league starter at the hot corner, as Feliz has been for most of the decade. I will strongly contend, however, that Feliz is one of the smoothest and most impressive glovemen to ever play that position. He fields the barehanded dribbler better than anybody I've ever seen, ranges well in all directions, and has a canon for an arm. Thankfully, the stats back me up. Over the course of the decade he compiled a UZR of 76.4 and a UZR/150 of 15.5. Here's how that compares to other third basemen from the top ten in games played during this decade.

UZR/150:

Pedro Feliz 15.5

Scott Rolen 15.5

Adrian Beltre 13.9

Brandon Inge 6.9

Mike Lowell -0.2

Aramis Ramirez -1.5

Alex Rodriguez -2.2

Melvin Mora -2.8

Chipper Jones -3.3

Troy Glaus -5.4

As you can see, Feliz deserves to be ranked on equal footing with Rolen and Beltre as the best defenders of the decade at their position, leaps and bounds ahead of the rest of the field. That Feliz did not win a Gold Glove, while David Wright and Mike Lowell did, is among this decade's significant injustices.

Best Season: 2007 Giants (20 HR, 72 RBI, 708 OPS, 22.3 UZR, 2.8 WAR)

The Sporting Hippeaux's All-Decade Team:

C - Joe Mauer

1B - Albert Pujols

2B - Chase Utley

3B - Alex Rodriguez

SS - Miguel Tejada (This isn't just because I hate Jeter, stats back me up.)

LF - Barry Bonds

CF - Carlos Beltran

RF - Ichiro Suzuki

DH - David Ortiz

SP - Roy Halladay

SP - Randy Johnson

SP - Johan Santana

SP - Pedro Martinez

SP - C. C. Sabathia

RP - Mariano Rivera

RP - Billy Wagner

RP - Trevor Hoffman

RP - Francisco Rodriguez

RP - Joe Nathan

Honorable Mentions:

C - Victor Martinez

1B/3B - Carlos Delgado

2B/SS - Derek Jeter

OF - Vladimir Guerrero

OF - Andruw Jones

Offseason Prospectus #5: The Oakland Athletics

Last season, Billy Beane, Moneyball icon and godfather of the modern GM, uncharacteristically chased a straight. He attempted to make a run at the postseason by virtue of a strategy completely contrary to that which made him famous. He traded a blue-chip prospect (Carlos Gonzalez) for one season from an impending free agent slugger (Matt Holliday). He signed a quartet of aging injury-prone veterans - Jason Giambi, Orlando Cabrera, Nomar Garciaparra, and Adam Kennedy. He planted his top four pitching prospects - Brett Anderson, Trevor Cahill, Vin Mazzaro, and Gio Gonzalez - in the starting rotation, even though it meant jump-starting their progress towards arbitration. He handed outfield spots to two players with low on-base percentages - Rajai Davis and Ryan Sweeney. Basically, he was the exact opposite of what Michael Lewis advertised way back in 2003.

Except, really he wasn't. This was Moneyball at it's core. The approach was different, but the strategy's essence was the same. Beane was playing against the market. With the economy plummeting, most GMs were reluctant to be aggressive, especially with veterans, so Cabrera, Giambi, and Garciaparra were available for relatively cheap, one-year deals. There was significant statistical evidence that the "Juiced Ball Era" was over, so speed and defense were reaching a new premium. Enter Davis, Kennedy, and Sweeney.

Other teams were becoming more and more reluctant to rush big-ticket prospects to the majors, especially pitchers, because of the cost of arbitration, but that also meant they didn't always field a team of the best possible players, and left them susceptible to AA and AAA injuries. (Nothing is worse than sending a bonus baby to have Tommy John before he's ever pitched an inning for the big-league club.) In the wake of the "Joba rules," the "Liriano rules," the Zumaya project, and the arrival of Tim Lincecum, dominant from the moment he stepped on the mound right across the Bay, Beane had to be wondering if maybe a bunch of 21 and 22-year-olds could own the AL West, especially pitching in a spacious park like the Coliseum.

He decided, while his competitors (except for the Yankees), were acting cautiously, he would go for the gold. The rationale was sound. The results were abominable. Holliday had the worst start of his career. Same for Cabrera. Giambi was even worse, to the point of being released around midseason. Garciaparra, predictably, spent most of the season on the DL, as did Oakland's two best incumbent players, Eric Chavez and Justin Duchscherer. The A's scuffled to their third consecutive losing season with the second worst winning percentage of the Beane era, despite having the second highest payroll of any team he's ever fielded.

As I said, although the chips didn't fall the way he would've liked, it's hard to fault him for trying, but I think it's safe to say, he won't play his hand that way again in 2010.

Free Agents:

Bobby Crosby (30) SS/3B
Justin Duchscherer (32) RHSP
Nomar Garciaparra (36) DL
Adam Kennedy (34) 2B

Arbitration Eligible:

Santiago Casilla (30) RHRP
Jack Cust (31) OF/DH
Rajai Davis (29) CF
Joey Devine (26) RHRP
Scott Hairston (30) OF
Michael Wuertz (31) RHRP

ETA 2010?:

Chris Carter (23) 1B
Adrian Cardenas (22) 2B/SS
Tommy Everidge (27) 1B/3B
Clayton Mortensoen (25) RHSP
Eric Patterson (27) 2B/OF
Landon Powell (28) C
Brett Wallace (23) 3B

The good news is that last winter's spending spree certainly wasn't a complete waste. Beane dealt Holliday at the deadline and got back at least two quality prospects from the Cardinals, Brett Wallace and Clayton Mortenson, both of whom are likely to join the big-league club at some point next season. He sent Cabrera to the Twins for their 2nd round pick from 2008, Tyler Ladendorf, who's probably at least a couple years away from contributing.

The silver lining for the A's was that seven pitchers made nine or more starts for them in '09, none of them older than 25, and they still finished third in the league in ERA (helped a great deal by their bullpen, which finished #1). Brett Anderson made a serious case for Rookie of the Year (which was won by his teammate, closer Andrew Bailey) when he went 6-4 with a 3.48 ERA in the season's second half. Trevor Cahill threw 179 innings and finished with ten wins and a league-average ERA (4.63), despite being only 21-years-old. Gio Gonzalez struggled with control, but struck out 109 batters in 99 innings. Josh Outman, who was part of the Joe Blanton trade in '08, joined the rotation late in the year and went 4-1 with a 3.58 ERA in a dozen starts. Dallas Braden was solid (8-9, 3.89) and Vin Mazzaro showed flashes of brilliance (2.95 ERA in six June starts). It is not unreasonable to expect all of these pitchers to improve in 2010 and Beane still has Mortensen, Dana Eveland, and Edgar Gonzalez waiting for opportunities. I don't think I'm being hyperbolic when I predict that two or three years from now Anderson, Cahill, and Gio Gonzalez will have made Oakland fans forget about Hudson, Mulder, and Zito.

The real question for the Athletics is offense. Beane has had a lot of success in the past filling out his roster with useful role players. Guys who possessed one particular excellent skill set. He's still doing that. Rajai Davis is a solid center-field, leadoff type, who could easily lead the league in steals with a full season. Jack Cust is the classic low-average, high-strikeout slugger, who will belt 30 bombs and draw a ton of walks. Kurt Suzuki is a very good defensive backstop, who isn't an automatic out on offense. However, all of the really successful A's teams had at least one or two superlative hitters in the middle of the lineup, guys like Chavez, Giambi, Miguel Tejada, Jermaine Dye, and Frank Thomas. The current A's do not possess such a player, and haven't since they let Thomas walk after his last great season in 2006. Carlos Gonzalez had the tools to become such a player, but was traded to Colorado for Holliday.

Perhaps Beane is convinced that Chris Carter and Brett Wallace have that kind of high-end potential. If so, they will probably get a chance to show flickers of it this coming year. The clock is now ticking on Beane's young arms. If he wants to have a run with them like the one he put together early in this decade with the first "Big Three," he will need to bring all the pieces together in time for 2011. Even though Oakland has very little money committed going into 2010, I expect Beane will be inactive this offseason. He will give many at-bats next year to Wallace, Carter, Daric Barton, Eric Patterson, Landon Powell, and whoever else he believes could develop into an everyday player. It wouldn't surprise me if he uses valuable pieces like Cust and Mark Ellis to increase his stockpile of young talent at midseason, so that next year he will have both the money and tradable resources to acquire whatever he still needs to become a competitor for the next three or four seasons.

Projected 2010 Opening Day Roster (Revised 1/1):

RF Rajai Davis (R)

2B Mark Ellis (R)

3B Eric Chavez (L)

DH Jake Fox (R)

1B Daric Barton (L)

C Kurt Suzuki (R)

LF Eric Patterson (L)

CF Coco Crisp (S)

SS Cliff Pennington (S)

SP Justin Duchscherer (R)

SP Brett Anderson (L)

SP Trevor Cahill (R)

SP Dallas Braden (L)

SP Vin Mazzaro (R)

CL Andrew Bailey (R)

SU Brad Ziegler (R)

SU Michael Wuertz (R)

LOOGY Dana Eveland (L)

MR Joey Devine (R)

SWING Gio Gonzalez (L)

SWING Josh Outman (L)

C Landon Powell (S)

1B Chris Carter (R)

IF Aaron Miles (S)

OF Ryan Sweeney (L)

The New Moneyball Icon

A few years back, in 2003, Micheal Lewis published a book called Moneyball which became synonymous with a new approach to baseball strategy at the general managing level. The subject of Moneyball was, specifically, Oakland GM Billy Beane, generally considered the mastermind behind this new approach, though he would likely give due credit to the many sabermetricians, like Bill James and Rob Neyer, and modern baseball geniuses, like John Schuerholz and Tony LaRussa, who have in some way or another participated in revising the way a baseball roster is viewed during the past decade.

It is accurate to say, as many have, that Moneyball preaches an increased allegiance to statistical analysis as a way of evaluating individual players and the teams that they play for. Standing alone, naturally, this is a gross oversimplification of Beane's philosophy, but it is undeniable that Moneyball helped popularize statistics like OBP, OPS, and WHIP, and that it was due, at least in part, to said statistics that Beane pursued players like Scott Hatteburg, Erubiel Durazo, Nick Swisher, Chad Bradford, and Mark Ellis. None of these players are superstars (though perhaps Swisher is on the cusp), but they have all been inexpensive contributors in the Athletics franchise, which has gone 901-718 (.557) since Beane took over the reigns in 1998. He has led them to five playoff appearance, and posted the franchise only back-to-back 100-win seasons since 1931. 2007 was the first year a Beane team finished under .500 since his first year as GM. All this despite the fact that Oakland has never had a payroll higher than $80 Million or 16th best in the major leagues. When they won 100 games in '01 and '02, their payrolls were 29th and 28th, respectively.

Several of Beane's proteges have moved on to GM jobs of their own. Most notably, current Blue Jays GM J. P. Riccardi, who figures prominently in Moneyball. Many successful GMs, from both big and small markets, have adapted Moneyball tactics to fit there needs, including Theo Epstein in Boston, Kevin Towers in San Diego, and Walt Jocketty in St. Louis. They are both Beane disciples and innovators in their own right.

The simplest way to describe the Moneyball strategy when it comes to acquiring players via trades and free agency, is to say that it targets players who are "slightly damaged." That is, there is something about them that is going to raise the eyebrows of potential suitors, whether it is age, a weight problem, a weak throwing arm, a reckless temper, a history of injuries, an awkward delivery, a tendency to strike out, a defensive liability, a bad platoon split, or just plain slowness. Ideally, such a player also has a strength which is likely to go overlooked: discipline at the plate, reliability, endurance, bat control, or a good platoon split.

Here are a few examples:

Prior to the 2003 season, Beane masterminded a four-team trade, acquiring Erubiel Durazo from the Arizona Diamondbacks. The Athletics gave up the only player in the deal who never reached the majors, a relief pitcher named Jason Arnold. Durazo was slow, fat, and apparently unable to hit left-handed pitching, which is why he'd never been a full-time starter in Arizona. During his next two seasons in Oakland, playing everyday as the designated hitter, he hit 43 HR, scored 172 runs, and drove in 165 more. He even received a few votes for MVP in 2004. In 2003 he actually hit lefties better than righties. Over the course of those two seasons the Athletics paid Durazo a total of just over $3 Million. As a comparison, the Yankees paid Jason Giambi, a former Athletic, approximately $24 Million in '03-'04. He hit 53 HR, scored 130 runs, and drove in 147 RBI.

Between 2004 and 2005, Beane dealt two of his "Big Three" starting pitcher, Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder. For Mulder, he received Dan Haren, Daric Barton, and Kiko Calero from St. Louis. The Cardinals saw Haren as, at best, a back-end of the rotation starter, they were concerned about his lack of intensity on the mound and his tendency to give up the long ball. During the 2004 season they had even converted him into a reliever. Beane immediately inserted the 24-year-old into his rotation. Haren pitched upward of 200 innings in each of the next three seasons, going 43-34. Calero has been a valuable middle reliever, and Barton is likely to start next season as Oakland's first baseman. Meanwhile, Mulder has gone 22-18 in three injury-plagued seasons in St. Louis, while earning around $18 Million. Oakland has paid the trio of Haren, Barton, and Calero somewhere in the neighborhood of $6 Million.

In 2006, the Athletics signed Frank Thomas, the future hall-of-famer who'd watched from the disabled list as the White Sox, the team he'd spent 15 seasons with, won the World Series in 2005 and decided they no longer needed him. He was 38, coming off back-to-back injury plagued seasons. Beane signed him to be the A's DH for a measly $500,000, one sixteenth of what Thomas made from Chicago the year previous. He finished 2006 with 39 HR, 114 RBI, and a 925 OPS. He was fourth in the running for the MVP and led the Athletics to the playoffs, while the White Sox fell short on a return trip. Thomas' replacement, Jim Thome, was roughly his statistical equal, but he cost Chicago 28 times more money.

One might argue that Beane deftness in deals like these (as well as many others) inspired other GMs to take chances on guys like Carlos Pena (can't hit lefties), Dmitri Young (old, fat, tempermental), Josh Hamilton (addicted to meth), and Cris Carpenter (injury-prone).

This offseason we are seeing the backlash. There is no shortage of "slightly damaged" players
Mike Cameron is facing a suspension, coming of an injury and took a small step backward offensively and defensively in 2007. Andruw Jones just had the worst offensive season since his rookie year, appears a little pudgy, and isn't even considered an option by the team he's spent his entire career with. Bartolo Colon hasn't pitched more than 100 innings since he won the Cy Young in '05, he'll turn 35 in May, and weighs well over 250 lbs., regardless of what the media guide says. Barry Bonds, Milton Bradley, Jose Guillen, Eric Gagne, Carlos Silva, Jason Jennings: all come with serious risks. And yet, at least in these opening weeks of the Hot Stove season, few of these players seem resigned to taking a contract that, either in value or duration, compensates for such shortcomings. The somewhat understandable position of baseball agents has become, in the wake of Moneyball, that merely being an established major league player in your late twenties or early thirties means you're entitled to a big payday, regardless of any extenuating circumstances. This may appear to some as indicative of greed and stubbornness on the part of the players and their representation (and there may be some truth to that), but it is also true that the game generally and each individual team is more profitable than it has ever been. The benefits of supportive fans and diversified revenue streams should not be passed on only to the owners and players the caliber of A-Rod, Carlos Zambrano, and Ichiro, but to all the players, particularly those who have paid their dues, as Cameron, Jones, Colon, et al definitely have.

A few years ago, coming off a brutal injury and three straight season of declining productivity, Jermaine Dye, a power-hitting outfielder in his prime, took a two-year deal (with an optional third year) for under $10 Million. Dye turned in two solid, relatively healthy seasons for the White Sox (including an MVP-caliber campaign in '06) and was rewarded with an extension worth more than double the money. This would seem an appropriate template for Andruw Jones. The dollar values would be considerably higher, but the idea would be the same. Take a short term deal, re-establish himself, and then get an even bigger contract when he's 33 or 34. His agent, the ubiquitous Scott Boras, continues to quote Jones' expectations as somewhere between Torii Hunter (5 yr./$90 Mil.) and Vernon Wells (7 yr./$126 Mil.). I think it is almost certain that they will at least get a four or five year deal worth upwards of $15 Million per season. Cameron will likely end up in the range of Gary Matthews Jr. (5 yr./$50 Mil.) and Juan Pierre (5 yr./$44 Mil.), though maybe for less years.

As the market adapts, GMs will have to reconsider their Moneyball tactics. With less players taking short-term deals, there is a much higher price on reliability, even if it is merely reliable mediocrity (witness Jeff Suppan (4 yr./$42 Mil.), Jason Marquis (3 yr./$21 Mil.), and A. J. Pierzynski (3 yr./$18 Mil.)). Likewise, as we have already seen this offseason, we will probably be seeing more trades that have long-term repercussions for both clubs. There will be fewer deadline blockbusters and one-year rent-a-players. If you're giving up three or four top prospects for a Johan Santana, Miguel Cabrera, or Mark Texeira, you intend to sign them to a five or six year extension.

Although there is no guaranteeing that Beane will be at the forefront of the next trend, watch carefully what he does this offseason. He may be on the verge of blowing up his team, a la the Florida Marlins, beginning a full-scale, multiple season rebuilding process of the type that has been generally unpopular during the Moneyball era. If he trades away Joe Blanton and Dan Haren, as rumored, it will definitely be unconventional. Pitching is regarded as a rare commodity, so frontline starters almost never get traded in the middle of their contracts. Both Haren and Blanton have three years left before free agency at prices well below their market value. Beane can reasonable ask for packages equivalent to those being offered for Santana, Jon Garland, etc., because Haren and Blanton will be significantly cheaper investments. If Haren and Blanton get traded, I expect there could be a wholesale auction, with Rich Harden, Huston Street, Bobby Crosby, Dan Johnson, Mark Kotsay, and Nick Swisher all on the block. Beane will be looking for prospects around which to build his new suburban stadium.

So, who is the next Moneyball icon? The player who presents a moderate risk, with a sizable potential for reward? Later this week I'll outline a few free agents (or soon-to-be free agents) that fit the profile.