The Giants & The Beanstalk

Although I certainly would've preferred the World Series to run on a little longer with a little better showing from the Rangers, as I've probably made quite clear, I'm very satisfied with this result.  The Giants are a "fairytale" team.  And, every once in awhile, baseball needs a fairytale champion.  Sadly, the ratings were bad, as the casual fan was less likely to be familiar with the narratives of these players and the history of these teams, which was a large part of what made them interesting.  But by winning the World Series for the first time in half a century, during a season when few people picked them to finish better than second or third in their division, the Giants dignified that optimism which inspires fans every March and April: "With a few good breaks, with a few smart decisions, this could be our year."

This is a big part of why the Rangers/Giants matchup was "good for baseball," even if it wasn't good for Fox Corp (and, by the way, fuck what's good for Fox Corp).  Baseball thrives on the performance of the underdog.  Let's face it, it's only the first of November and we already know there are less than half a dozen teams with a chance of winning the NBA title next June.  March Madness consists of 64 teams, but we all know less than a quarter of those have even the slightest chance.  The NFL thrives on the rhetoric of competitive balance (and rhetoric whose main aim is to somehow dignify an inhumane labor policy), but nearly half the teams in their league have never won a Super Bowl.  Baseball has had nine champions in the last ten seasons.  Two of those champions were first-time winners (Angels & D-Backs) and three had waited more than a generation (ChiSox, BoSox, & Giants).  One could easily argue that, on that basis, there's more balance in baseball than in any other sport, even though it doesn't have a salary cap and hopefully never will.

So, there's the good, but, frankly, I've had enough optimism.  The fact is, although I thoroughly enjoyed this season and these playoffs, now it's all over, and that inevitably puts me in a sour mood.  Here are some reasons why this season sucks:

1.) Yankee Fans

From the meathead bigot who slapped Nelson Cruz's glove during the NLCS to the jackasses that spit on Cliff Lee's wife.  Yankee fandom has reached a new nadir.  Maybe it's the fact that Hank and Hal are sleazier and more entitled than their old man (who would've thought it possible).  Maybe it's the fact that the new stadium is an overpriced, simulacrum haven for Caucasians.  Maybe it's the fact that the pinstriped ethos has turned soulful players like C. C. Sabathia, Nick Swisher, and Curtis Granderson into stilted shadows of their former selves.  Whatever the cause, the Yankees are more despicable than ever, and the widespread ignorance and arrogance of their supporters may be the main reason why.  Enjoy the rapid decline of A-Rod and the "Core Four."  You deserve it.

2.) Brian Sabean

I think my position on the likability of this team is pretty well documented, but the Giants GM was very fortunate that a strategy which looks a hell of a lot like a desperate shot in the dark actually paid off.  Sabean, baseball's longest tenured GM, has a few things to hang his hat on.  The Giants have drafted well.  They've developed young pitchers as well as any franchise in the sport.  They've got a great ballpark and a very supportive fanbase, despite a great deal of controversy and the number of crappy teams they've fielded during the last decade.  However, by winning the 2010 World Series, the Giants players basically got Sabean off the hook for what has been a pretty embarrassing stretch of acquisitions, dating back to the infamous Liriano, Nathan, and Bonser for one year of A. J. Pierzynski trade in 2003.  As I discussed in my previous post, this team is on the hook for some really bad contracts: Barry Zito, Aaron Rowand, and Mark DeRosa top the list.  And those are just the ones that are still on the books.  Resigning Bengie Molina was patently absurd.  One can argue that Edgar Renteria justified his ridiculous contract with a World Series MVP, by remember how much money the Giants paid to other over-the-hill veterans like Randy Winn, Rich Aurilia, and Dave Roberts.  All are likable players, all were at one point productive, but not so much when Sabean was paying them.  Sabean's fiscal record is among the worst in the sport.  Will winning buy the Bay Area hundreds of millions more dollars in bad contracts?

3.) Seth Everett

I can't possibly do any better than to direct you to the recent "re-reunion" of Fire Joe Morgan, but at a time when research is getting easier, access is more abundant, and competition is fierce, mainstream media commentators are somehow growing more incompetent.  Peter Pascarelli isn't exactly a baseball genius, but they replaced him on the ESPN Baseball Today podcast with an asinine self-promotor named Seth Everett who made the show pretty much unlistenable.  By host Eric Karabell's own admission, his podcast is made specifically for rabid baseball fans, yet Everett frequently exposes an ignorance of the sport to the point of not knowing which player is on which team and babbles on incessantly about his personal life, which is about as interesting as the underside of the refrigerator and should be as inaccessible.  The Baseball Today situation may be a synechdoche for the problems which abound throughout the baseball media.  Pascarelli was fired because he made a relatively mild joke about the new statue of Bud Selig in Milwaukee.  The iron hand of MLB has made good journalists weary of being critical, objective, candid, witty, and spontaneous when it comes to coverage of their sport.  And thus we're left with the smug, insubstantial musings of half-wits like Everett and his ilk.

4.) Backlash Against Defensive Sabermetrics

One of the major stories of last offseason was the attempt, especially by forward-thinking GMs like Theo Epstein, Billy Beane, and Jack Zduriencik, to build their rosters around defensive efficiency, measured in part by things like UZR, the Fielding Bible, and no doubt many other in-house statistics.  Unfortunately, none of these teams made extraordinary leaps in the standings in the wake of this strategy.  In fact, quite the opposite.  The Red Sox, though still a solid team, dropped six wins from 2009 and finished out of the postseason for the first time since 2006.  The Mariners, following an optimism-inducing 85-win campaign in '09, dropped to 61 wins, one of the worst records in baseball.  And though the Athletics managed to get to .500 for the first time since '06, they remained well short of contention.  Anti-sabermetric pundits will use this opportunity to berate us for thinking that defense is measurable.  The truth is, Boston's season was derailed by injuries, Zduriencik couldn't possibly have predicted how bad his team would be offensively (historically bad), and a closer look at Oakland (forthcoming) suggest that Beane's approach has some legitimacy.  In all likelihood, however, that's not how the story will be treated during this offseason.

5.) Chicago Cubs Still Chicago Cubs

This one hurts.  The Cubs got back to losing in 2010 and not only that, they got back to losing in sensational and humiliating fashion.  They had the largest payroll in the National League, yet they managed to finish fifth in their division, behind even the Houston Astros, who started the season by going 16-33 and then traded away two of their best players.  The Cubs best (and most expensive) pitcher got demoted to the bullpen, than suspended from the team, and now his future may no longer be in Chicago.  The three best (and most expensive) hitters were all busts, looking old, slow, and brittle.  The $136 Million prize, Alfonso Soriano, had the same WAR (2.9) as Denard Span.  He has four years left on his contract, at $18 Million per annum (in other words, for the same price we could probably have Carl Crawford).  Lou Pinella "retired," but the new ownership, for some unknown reason, still hasn't gotten around to firing Jim Hendry, who has presided over the creation of this mess, apparently in perpetuity.  Now they've got a rookie manager, very little payroll flexibility, and a stacked division.  The decade just began, but it already looks like this might not be the one in which we'll finally break the curse.  Congrats to San Francisco, Boston, and the White Sox.  It's getting very lonely in Loserville.

Billy Beane's Latest Swindle

It's days like these which make it hard to be a Cubs fan. Sure, it stings a little when Ryan Dempster gives up a three-run bomb to Manny Ramirez in the NLDS or when Alex Gonzalez boots a routine double-play ball in eight-inning of Game 6 of the NLCS, but it's those moments which make us who we are. Admit it, Cubs fans, the sting of defeat snatched from the jaws of victory, painful though it may be, has buried deep within it the promise of delayed gratification. Cubs fans are masochists, ascetics, and Puritans. We have dedicated ourselves to a glory which is always on the horizon. But when it is finally reached, if it is ever reached, our euphoria will be unprecedented. Yankees fans will never experience joy like that. White Sox and Red Sox fans, sympathetic as they may be, will never experience joy like that. To be a lifelong Cubs fan is to maintain the dream of a heavenly reward on earth.

But, Oh!, there will be suffering and there will be trials, and there will be days like these. In his rookie year, Jake Fox hit eleven homers and drove in 44 runs, unspectacular numbers, except when you consider he started only 62 games and got only 241 plate appearances. Extrapolate his numbers over a full season and he would've been one of the leading candidates for Rookie of the Year in the National League. Which should be no surprise. Between AA and AAA in 2008, Fox had 31 HR and 105 RBI. In just 45 games at AAA in '09 he had 17 HR and 53 RBI, maintaining a .409 AVG and a 1336 OPS. This kid can rake!

Unfortunately, in Chicago he was a man without a position. Derrek Lee and Aramis Ramirez are entrenched at the corners and Fox isn't well-suited to the outfield. So, what Jim Hendry had this offseason was a player who had proved he was ready and able to be a productive hitter at the major-league level AND who wouldn't be eligible for arbitration until after the 2011 season. This is one of the best bargaining chips a general manager can have: a player who isn't essential to his own plans, but who offers considerable value to many of his competitors. Jake Fox, I had unwisely presumed, would be one of the lynchpins in a trade for serious major-league talent. Sure, he's got defensive issues and he strikes out a lot, but combined with another prospect or two, Fox could've helped the Cubs land Dan Uggla or Curtis Granderson, both of whom currently play for teams which have places for Fox to play (1B/DH) and covet the financial alleviation he would offer.

Instead, for the second year in a row, Jim Hendry essentially gave away the best tradable commodity he had in his arsenal. Last winter it was Mark DeRosa who he handed to the Indians for a couple of minor-league relievers, Jeff Stevens and John Gaub, and a very young starting pitcher, Chris Archer, who, to be fair, pitched fairly well at the A-level in '09 (6-4, 2.81 ERA, 119 K/66 BB, 109 IP). While all three of these pitchers may end up giving the Cubs some quality innings, with Archer having an outside shot at becoming a member of the rotation down the road, DeRosa would've been real handy to have last season when Mike Fontenot, Jeff Baker, Aaron Miles, and others were combining to give us 7 HR and a 666 OPS from the second base position. Instead, DeRosa ended up playing for the team the Cubs were chasing down the stretch, as the Indians proved how much he was actually worth on the open market. For two months of Mark DeRosa, St. Louis gave Cleveland their two of their best major-league ready relief-pitching prospects, Chris Perez and Jess Todd.

The Jake Fox deal is even more egregious. The two prospects in the deal, Ronny Moria and Matt Spencer, are nothing more than "organizational depth." Moria is a 23-year-old who hasn't advanced past the low-A level, where he has pitched poorly. Spencer, also 23, has hit decently as high as AA, where he posted an 808 OPS in 409 plate appearances last season. Nonetheless, the high-end of his potential probably makes him at best a fourth outfielder in the majors. He's Micah Hoffpauir...lite.

So, the "impact" piece in the Fox deal is Jeff Gray, another middle reliever, who posted a 3.76 ERA for the A's in 26 innings last season. He doesn't have closer-type stuff and has a pedestrian 3.57 ERA in 163 AAA innings. In other words, what Jim Hendry got for Jake Fox was a single middle reliever who looks a hell of a lot like the abundance of middle relievers, including Stevens and Gaub, who the Cubs already have in the organization!

Meanwhile, in addition to giving up a premier prospect for absolutely nothing that they don't already have in abundance, they will pay approximately half of Aaron Miles contract while he's playing for Oakland. Sure, Miles was unimpressive in '09. Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot offer the same skill-set with more upside for less money, but Miles is nonetheless a proven major-league back-up infielder, whose position flexibility and ability to hit for average (.282 career) give him minimal value. I think it is safe to say he's worth almost as much as Jeff Gray, who isn't much better than a replacement-level reliever. It is very, very possible that when this trade is evaluated a year or two from now, the Cubs will have given Billy Beane the two most valuable players in the deal and $1,000,000. That's adding insult to injury.

Offseason Prospectus #5: The Oakland Athletics

Last season, Billy Beane, Moneyball icon and godfather of the modern GM, uncharacteristically chased a straight. He attempted to make a run at the postseason by virtue of a strategy completely contrary to that which made him famous. He traded a blue-chip prospect (Carlos Gonzalez) for one season from an impending free agent slugger (Matt Holliday). He signed a quartet of aging injury-prone veterans - Jason Giambi, Orlando Cabrera, Nomar Garciaparra, and Adam Kennedy. He planted his top four pitching prospects - Brett Anderson, Trevor Cahill, Vin Mazzaro, and Gio Gonzalez - in the starting rotation, even though it meant jump-starting their progress towards arbitration. He handed outfield spots to two players with low on-base percentages - Rajai Davis and Ryan Sweeney. Basically, he was the exact opposite of what Michael Lewis advertised way back in 2003.

Except, really he wasn't. This was Moneyball at it's core. The approach was different, but the strategy's essence was the same. Beane was playing against the market. With the economy plummeting, most GMs were reluctant to be aggressive, especially with veterans, so Cabrera, Giambi, and Garciaparra were available for relatively cheap, one-year deals. There was significant statistical evidence that the "Juiced Ball Era" was over, so speed and defense were reaching a new premium. Enter Davis, Kennedy, and Sweeney.

Other teams were becoming more and more reluctant to rush big-ticket prospects to the majors, especially pitchers, because of the cost of arbitration, but that also meant they didn't always field a team of the best possible players, and left them susceptible to AA and AAA injuries. (Nothing is worse than sending a bonus baby to have Tommy John before he's ever pitched an inning for the big-league club.) In the wake of the "Joba rules," the "Liriano rules," the Zumaya project, and the arrival of Tim Lincecum, dominant from the moment he stepped on the mound right across the Bay, Beane had to be wondering if maybe a bunch of 21 and 22-year-olds could own the AL West, especially pitching in a spacious park like the Coliseum.

He decided, while his competitors (except for the Yankees), were acting cautiously, he would go for the gold. The rationale was sound. The results were abominable. Holliday had the worst start of his career. Same for Cabrera. Giambi was even worse, to the point of being released around midseason. Garciaparra, predictably, spent most of the season on the DL, as did Oakland's two best incumbent players, Eric Chavez and Justin Duchscherer. The A's scuffled to their third consecutive losing season with the second worst winning percentage of the Beane era, despite having the second highest payroll of any team he's ever fielded.

As I said, although the chips didn't fall the way he would've liked, it's hard to fault him for trying, but I think it's safe to say, he won't play his hand that way again in 2010.

Free Agents:

Bobby Crosby (30) SS/3B
Justin Duchscherer (32) RHSP
Nomar Garciaparra (36) DL
Adam Kennedy (34) 2B

Arbitration Eligible:

Santiago Casilla (30) RHRP
Jack Cust (31) OF/DH
Rajai Davis (29) CF
Joey Devine (26) RHRP
Scott Hairston (30) OF
Michael Wuertz (31) RHRP

ETA 2010?:

Chris Carter (23) 1B
Adrian Cardenas (22) 2B/SS
Tommy Everidge (27) 1B/3B
Clayton Mortensoen (25) RHSP
Eric Patterson (27) 2B/OF
Landon Powell (28) C
Brett Wallace (23) 3B

The good news is that last winter's spending spree certainly wasn't a complete waste. Beane dealt Holliday at the deadline and got back at least two quality prospects from the Cardinals, Brett Wallace and Clayton Mortenson, both of whom are likely to join the big-league club at some point next season. He sent Cabrera to the Twins for their 2nd round pick from 2008, Tyler Ladendorf, who's probably at least a couple years away from contributing.

The silver lining for the A's was that seven pitchers made nine or more starts for them in '09, none of them older than 25, and they still finished third in the league in ERA (helped a great deal by their bullpen, which finished #1). Brett Anderson made a serious case for Rookie of the Year (which was won by his teammate, closer Andrew Bailey) when he went 6-4 with a 3.48 ERA in the season's second half. Trevor Cahill threw 179 innings and finished with ten wins and a league-average ERA (4.63), despite being only 21-years-old. Gio Gonzalez struggled with control, but struck out 109 batters in 99 innings. Josh Outman, who was part of the Joe Blanton trade in '08, joined the rotation late in the year and went 4-1 with a 3.58 ERA in a dozen starts. Dallas Braden was solid (8-9, 3.89) and Vin Mazzaro showed flashes of brilliance (2.95 ERA in six June starts). It is not unreasonable to expect all of these pitchers to improve in 2010 and Beane still has Mortensen, Dana Eveland, and Edgar Gonzalez waiting for opportunities. I don't think I'm being hyperbolic when I predict that two or three years from now Anderson, Cahill, and Gio Gonzalez will have made Oakland fans forget about Hudson, Mulder, and Zito.

The real question for the Athletics is offense. Beane has had a lot of success in the past filling out his roster with useful role players. Guys who possessed one particular excellent skill set. He's still doing that. Rajai Davis is a solid center-field, leadoff type, who could easily lead the league in steals with a full season. Jack Cust is the classic low-average, high-strikeout slugger, who will belt 30 bombs and draw a ton of walks. Kurt Suzuki is a very good defensive backstop, who isn't an automatic out on offense. However, all of the really successful A's teams had at least one or two superlative hitters in the middle of the lineup, guys like Chavez, Giambi, Miguel Tejada, Jermaine Dye, and Frank Thomas. The current A's do not possess such a player, and haven't since they let Thomas walk after his last great season in 2006. Carlos Gonzalez had the tools to become such a player, but was traded to Colorado for Holliday.

Perhaps Beane is convinced that Chris Carter and Brett Wallace have that kind of high-end potential. If so, they will probably get a chance to show flickers of it this coming year. The clock is now ticking on Beane's young arms. If he wants to have a run with them like the one he put together early in this decade with the first "Big Three," he will need to bring all the pieces together in time for 2011. Even though Oakland has very little money committed going into 2010, I expect Beane will be inactive this offseason. He will give many at-bats next year to Wallace, Carter, Daric Barton, Eric Patterson, Landon Powell, and whoever else he believes could develop into an everyday player. It wouldn't surprise me if he uses valuable pieces like Cust and Mark Ellis to increase his stockpile of young talent at midseason, so that next year he will have both the money and tradable resources to acquire whatever he still needs to become a competitor for the next three or four seasons.

Projected 2010 Opening Day Roster (Revised 1/1):

RF Rajai Davis (R)

2B Mark Ellis (R)

3B Eric Chavez (L)

DH Jake Fox (R)

1B Daric Barton (L)

C Kurt Suzuki (R)

LF Eric Patterson (L)

CF Coco Crisp (S)

SS Cliff Pennington (S)

SP Justin Duchscherer (R)

SP Brett Anderson (L)

SP Trevor Cahill (R)

SP Dallas Braden (L)

SP Vin Mazzaro (R)

CL Andrew Bailey (R)

SU Brad Ziegler (R)

SU Michael Wuertz (R)

LOOGY Dana Eveland (L)

MR Joey Devine (R)

SWING Gio Gonzalez (L)

SWING Josh Outman (L)

C Landon Powell (S)

1B Chris Carter (R)

IF Aaron Miles (S)

OF Ryan Sweeney (L)

The New Moneyball Icon

A few years back, in 2003, Micheal Lewis published a book called Moneyball which became synonymous with a new approach to baseball strategy at the general managing level. The subject of Moneyball was, specifically, Oakland GM Billy Beane, generally considered the mastermind behind this new approach, though he would likely give due credit to the many sabermetricians, like Bill James and Rob Neyer, and modern baseball geniuses, like John Schuerholz and Tony LaRussa, who have in some way or another participated in revising the way a baseball roster is viewed during the past decade.

It is accurate to say, as many have, that Moneyball preaches an increased allegiance to statistical analysis as a way of evaluating individual players and the teams that they play for. Standing alone, naturally, this is a gross oversimplification of Beane's philosophy, but it is undeniable that Moneyball helped popularize statistics like OBP, OPS, and WHIP, and that it was due, at least in part, to said statistics that Beane pursued players like Scott Hatteburg, Erubiel Durazo, Nick Swisher, Chad Bradford, and Mark Ellis. None of these players are superstars (though perhaps Swisher is on the cusp), but they have all been inexpensive contributors in the Athletics franchise, which has gone 901-718 (.557) since Beane took over the reigns in 1998. He has led them to five playoff appearance, and posted the franchise only back-to-back 100-win seasons since 1931. 2007 was the first year a Beane team finished under .500 since his first year as GM. All this despite the fact that Oakland has never had a payroll higher than $80 Million or 16th best in the major leagues. When they won 100 games in '01 and '02, their payrolls were 29th and 28th, respectively.

Several of Beane's proteges have moved on to GM jobs of their own. Most notably, current Blue Jays GM J. P. Riccardi, who figures prominently in Moneyball. Many successful GMs, from both big and small markets, have adapted Moneyball tactics to fit there needs, including Theo Epstein in Boston, Kevin Towers in San Diego, and Walt Jocketty in St. Louis. They are both Beane disciples and innovators in their own right.

The simplest way to describe the Moneyball strategy when it comes to acquiring players via trades and free agency, is to say that it targets players who are "slightly damaged." That is, there is something about them that is going to raise the eyebrows of potential suitors, whether it is age, a weight problem, a weak throwing arm, a reckless temper, a history of injuries, an awkward delivery, a tendency to strike out, a defensive liability, a bad platoon split, or just plain slowness. Ideally, such a player also has a strength which is likely to go overlooked: discipline at the plate, reliability, endurance, bat control, or a good platoon split.

Here are a few examples:

Prior to the 2003 season, Beane masterminded a four-team trade, acquiring Erubiel Durazo from the Arizona Diamondbacks. The Athletics gave up the only player in the deal who never reached the majors, a relief pitcher named Jason Arnold. Durazo was slow, fat, and apparently unable to hit left-handed pitching, which is why he'd never been a full-time starter in Arizona. During his next two seasons in Oakland, playing everyday as the designated hitter, he hit 43 HR, scored 172 runs, and drove in 165 more. He even received a few votes for MVP in 2004. In 2003 he actually hit lefties better than righties. Over the course of those two seasons the Athletics paid Durazo a total of just over $3 Million. As a comparison, the Yankees paid Jason Giambi, a former Athletic, approximately $24 Million in '03-'04. He hit 53 HR, scored 130 runs, and drove in 147 RBI.

Between 2004 and 2005, Beane dealt two of his "Big Three" starting pitcher, Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder. For Mulder, he received Dan Haren, Daric Barton, and Kiko Calero from St. Louis. The Cardinals saw Haren as, at best, a back-end of the rotation starter, they were concerned about his lack of intensity on the mound and his tendency to give up the long ball. During the 2004 season they had even converted him into a reliever. Beane immediately inserted the 24-year-old into his rotation. Haren pitched upward of 200 innings in each of the next three seasons, going 43-34. Calero has been a valuable middle reliever, and Barton is likely to start next season as Oakland's first baseman. Meanwhile, Mulder has gone 22-18 in three injury-plagued seasons in St. Louis, while earning around $18 Million. Oakland has paid the trio of Haren, Barton, and Calero somewhere in the neighborhood of $6 Million.

In 2006, the Athletics signed Frank Thomas, the future hall-of-famer who'd watched from the disabled list as the White Sox, the team he'd spent 15 seasons with, won the World Series in 2005 and decided they no longer needed him. He was 38, coming off back-to-back injury plagued seasons. Beane signed him to be the A's DH for a measly $500,000, one sixteenth of what Thomas made from Chicago the year previous. He finished 2006 with 39 HR, 114 RBI, and a 925 OPS. He was fourth in the running for the MVP and led the Athletics to the playoffs, while the White Sox fell short on a return trip. Thomas' replacement, Jim Thome, was roughly his statistical equal, but he cost Chicago 28 times more money.

One might argue that Beane deftness in deals like these (as well as many others) inspired other GMs to take chances on guys like Carlos Pena (can't hit lefties), Dmitri Young (old, fat, tempermental), Josh Hamilton (addicted to meth), and Cris Carpenter (injury-prone).

This offseason we are seeing the backlash. There is no shortage of "slightly damaged" players
Mike Cameron is facing a suspension, coming of an injury and took a small step backward offensively and defensively in 2007. Andruw Jones just had the worst offensive season since his rookie year, appears a little pudgy, and isn't even considered an option by the team he's spent his entire career with. Bartolo Colon hasn't pitched more than 100 innings since he won the Cy Young in '05, he'll turn 35 in May, and weighs well over 250 lbs., regardless of what the media guide says. Barry Bonds, Milton Bradley, Jose Guillen, Eric Gagne, Carlos Silva, Jason Jennings: all come with serious risks. And yet, at least in these opening weeks of the Hot Stove season, few of these players seem resigned to taking a contract that, either in value or duration, compensates for such shortcomings. The somewhat understandable position of baseball agents has become, in the wake of Moneyball, that merely being an established major league player in your late twenties or early thirties means you're entitled to a big payday, regardless of any extenuating circumstances. This may appear to some as indicative of greed and stubbornness on the part of the players and their representation (and there may be some truth to that), but it is also true that the game generally and each individual team is more profitable than it has ever been. The benefits of supportive fans and diversified revenue streams should not be passed on only to the owners and players the caliber of A-Rod, Carlos Zambrano, and Ichiro, but to all the players, particularly those who have paid their dues, as Cameron, Jones, Colon, et al definitely have.

A few years ago, coming off a brutal injury and three straight season of declining productivity, Jermaine Dye, a power-hitting outfielder in his prime, took a two-year deal (with an optional third year) for under $10 Million. Dye turned in two solid, relatively healthy seasons for the White Sox (including an MVP-caliber campaign in '06) and was rewarded with an extension worth more than double the money. This would seem an appropriate template for Andruw Jones. The dollar values would be considerably higher, but the idea would be the same. Take a short term deal, re-establish himself, and then get an even bigger contract when he's 33 or 34. His agent, the ubiquitous Scott Boras, continues to quote Jones' expectations as somewhere between Torii Hunter (5 yr./$90 Mil.) and Vernon Wells (7 yr./$126 Mil.). I think it is almost certain that they will at least get a four or five year deal worth upwards of $15 Million per season. Cameron will likely end up in the range of Gary Matthews Jr. (5 yr./$50 Mil.) and Juan Pierre (5 yr./$44 Mil.), though maybe for less years.

As the market adapts, GMs will have to reconsider their Moneyball tactics. With less players taking short-term deals, there is a much higher price on reliability, even if it is merely reliable mediocrity (witness Jeff Suppan (4 yr./$42 Mil.), Jason Marquis (3 yr./$21 Mil.), and A. J. Pierzynski (3 yr./$18 Mil.)). Likewise, as we have already seen this offseason, we will probably be seeing more trades that have long-term repercussions for both clubs. There will be fewer deadline blockbusters and one-year rent-a-players. If you're giving up three or four top prospects for a Johan Santana, Miguel Cabrera, or Mark Texeira, you intend to sign them to a five or six year extension.

Although there is no guaranteeing that Beane will be at the forefront of the next trend, watch carefully what he does this offseason. He may be on the verge of blowing up his team, a la the Florida Marlins, beginning a full-scale, multiple season rebuilding process of the type that has been generally unpopular during the Moneyball era. If he trades away Joe Blanton and Dan Haren, as rumored, it will definitely be unconventional. Pitching is regarded as a rare commodity, so frontline starters almost never get traded in the middle of their contracts. Both Haren and Blanton have three years left before free agency at prices well below their market value. Beane can reasonable ask for packages equivalent to those being offered for Santana, Jon Garland, etc., because Haren and Blanton will be significantly cheaper investments. If Haren and Blanton get traded, I expect there could be a wholesale auction, with Rich Harden, Huston Street, Bobby Crosby, Dan Johnson, Mark Kotsay, and Nick Swisher all on the block. Beane will be looking for prospects around which to build his new suburban stadium.

So, who is the next Moneyball icon? The player who presents a moderate risk, with a sizable potential for reward? Later this week I'll outline a few free agents (or soon-to-be free agents) that fit the profile.